#

Business Reforms for Protecting Minority Investors

Positive= Doing Business reform making it easier to do business.Negative= Change making it more difficult to do business.

Albania

DB 2016: Albania strengthened minority investor protections by introducing legal requirements for immediate disclosure of related-party transactions to the public.

DB 2009: Albania strengthened investor protections by introducing approval and disclosure requirements for related-party transactions and by reinforcing directors’ duties and available remedies in cases where related-party transactions are harmful to the company.

Armenia

DB 2013: Armenia strengthened investor protections by introducing a requirement for shareholder approval of related-party transactions, requiring greater disclosure of such transactions in the annual report and making it easier to sue directors when such transactions are prejudicial.

Azerbaijan

DB 2016: Azerbaijan strengthened minority investor protections by introducing requirements that related-party transactions undergo external review and be voted on by disinterested shareholders.

DB 2009: Azerbaijan strengthened investor protections by introducing requirements on the approval of related-party transactions and expanding remedies available against liable directors.

Belarus

DB 2017: Belarus strengthened minority investor protections by introducing remedies in cases where related-party transactions are harmful to the company and requiring greater corporate transparency.

DB 2012: Belarus strengthened investor protections by introducing requirements for greater corporate disclosure to the board of directors and to the public.

DB 2008: Belarus strengthened investor protections by introducing provisions on the approval of related-party transactions and increasing disclosure requirements for such transactions.

Benin

DB 2015: Benin strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

Botswana

DB 2009: Botswana strengthened investor protections by introducing requirements for shareholder approval of related-party transactions and by allowing shareholders to sue directors where such transactions harm the company, and obtain payment for damages if successful.

Brunei Darussalam

DB 2017: Brunei Darussalam strengthened minority investor protections by clarifying ownership and control structures, making it easier to sue directors in case of prejudicial related-party transactions, and allowing the rescission of related-party transactions that harm the company.

Burkina Faso

DB 2015: Burkina Faso strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

Burundi

DB 2012: Burundi strengthened investor protections by introducing new requirements for the approval of transactions between interested parties, by requiring greater corporate disclosure to the board of directors and in the annual report and by making it easier to sue directors in cases of prejudicial transactions between interested parties.

Cameroon

DB 2015: Cameroon strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

Central African Republic

DB 2015: The Central African Republic strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

Chad

DB 2015: Chad strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

Chile

DB 2011: An amendment to Chile’s securities law strengthened investor protections by requiring greater corporate disclosure and regulating the approval of transactions between interested parties.

Colombia

DB 2010: Colombia strengthened investor protections by making it easier to sue directors when a related-party transaction harms the company.

DB 2008: Colombia strengthened investor protections by increasing disclosure requirements for related-party transactions in the annual report.

Comoros

DB 2015: The Comoros strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

Congo, Dem Rep

DB 2015: The Democratic Republic of Congo strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

DB 2014: The Democratic Republic of Congo strengthened investor protections by adopting the OHADA Uniform Act on Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups, which introduces additional approval and disclosure requirements for related-party transactions and makes it possible to sue directors when such transactions harm the company.

Congo, Rep

DB 2015: The Republic of Congo strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

Cote d’Ivoire

DB 2015: Côte d’Ivoire strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

Croatia

DB 2017: Croatia strengthened minority investor protections by requiring detailed internal disclosure of conflicts of interest by directors.

Cyprus

DB 2012: Cyprus strengthened investor protections by requiring greater corporate disclosure to the board of directors, to the public and in the annual report.

Dominican Republic

DB 2015: The Dominican Republic strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater shareholder rights and requirements for greater corporate transparency.

DB 2010: The Dominican Republic strengthened investor protections through a new company law requiring greater corporate disclosure, director liability and shareholder access to information.

Ecuador

DB 2015: Ecuador strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions as well as a requirement that a potential acquirer make a tender offer to all shareholders upon acquiring voting shares.

Egypt, Arab Rep

DB 2017: The Arab Republic of Egypt strengthened minority investor protections by increasing shareholder rights and role in major corporate decisions and by clarifying ownership and control structures.

DB 2016: The Arab Republic of Egypt strengthened minority investor protections by barring subsidiaries from acquiring shares issued by their parent company.

DB 2015: The Arab Republic of Egypt strengthened minority investor protections by introducing additional requirements for approval of related-party transactions and greater requirements for disclosure of such transactions to the stock exchange.

DB 2009: Egypt strengthened investor protections by introducing a requirement that an independent auditor assess related-party transactions before approval.

El Salvador

DB 2012: El Salvador strengthened investor protections by allowing greater access to corporate information during the trial.

Equatorial Guinea

DB 2015: Equatorial Guinea strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

Fiji

DB 2017: Fiji strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater disclosure requirements for related-party transactions.

Gabon

DB 2015: Gabon strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

Gambia, The

DB 2015: The Gambia strengthened minority investor protections by clarifying the duties of directors and providing new venues and remedies for minority shareholders seeking redress for oppressive conduct.

Georgia

DB 2017: Georgia strengthened minority investor protections by increasing shareholder rights and role in major corporate decisions and by clarifying ownership and control structures.

DB 2012: Georgia strengthened investor protections by introducing requirements relating to the approval of transactions between interested parties.

DB 2011: Georgia strengthened investor protections by allowing greater access to corporate information during the trial.

DB 2008: Georgia strengthened investor protections by amending its securities law to enhance approval and disclosure requirements for related-party transactions.

Greece

DB 2014: Greece strengthened investor protections by introducing a requirement for director approval of related-party transactions.

DB 2013: Greece strengthened investor protections by requiring greater immediate and annual disclosure of material related-party transactions.

DB 2009: Greece strengthened investor protections by lowering the shareholding threshold required to initiate a derivative suit against directors.

Guinea

DB 2015: Guinea strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

Guinea-Bissau

DB 2015: Guinea-Bissau strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

Honduras

DB 2016: Honduras strengthened minority investor protections by introducing provisions requiring greater disclosure of related-party transactions, prohibiting interested parties from voting on a related-party transaction, allowing shareholders representing at least 5% of a company’s share capital to bring a direct action for damages against its directors and giving any shareholder the right to inspect company documents.

Hong Kong SAR, China

DB 2015: Hong Kong SAR, China, strengthened minority investor protections by introducing requirements for directors to provide more detailed disclosure of conflicts of interest to the other board members.

Iceland

DB 2012: Iceland strengthened investor protections by introducing new requirements relating to the approval of transactions between interested parties.

DB 2008: Iceland strengthened investor protections by requiring greater disclosure in the annual report to shareholders.

India

DB 2015: India strengthened minority investor protections by requiring greater disclosure of conflicts of interest by board members, increasing the remedies available in case of prejudicial related-party transactions and introducing additional safeguards for shareholders of privately held companies. This reform applies to both Delhi and Mumbai.

Indonesia

DB 2010: Indonesia strengthened investor protections by increasing disclosure requirements for related-party transactions.

DB 2008: Indonesia strengthened investor protections by expanding the already extensive disclosure requirements for companies listed on the stock exchange.

Iran, Islamic Rep

DB 2013: The Islamic Republic of Iran strengthened investor protections by requiring greater immediate disclosure of related-party transactions.

Ireland

DB 2016: Ireland strengthened minority investor protections by introducing provisions stipulating that directors can be held liable for breach of their fiduciary duties.

Kazakhstan

DB 2017: Kazakhstan strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for immediate disclosure of related-party transactions to the public, increasing shareholder rights and role in major corporate decisions, clarifying ownership and control structures and requiring greater corporate transparency.

DB 2016: Kazakhstan strengthened minority investor protections through new provisions requiring both immediate disclosure of related-party transactions and detailed disclosure in annual financial statements; expanding the way evidence can be obtained at trial; requiring that a change in the rights associated with shares be subject to approval by a vote of two-thirds of the affected shares; prohibiting subsidiaries from acquiring shares issued by their parent company; and requiring disclosure of information about board members’ other directorships as well as their primary employment.

DB 2012: Kazakhstan strengthened investor protections by regulating the approval of transactions between interested parties and making it easier to sue directors in cases of prejudicial transactions between interested parties.

DB 2011: Kazakhstan strengthened investor protections by requiring greater corporate disclosure in company annual reports.

Kenya

DB 2017: Kenya strengthened minority investor protections by clarifying ownership and control structures, by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors, by making it easier to sue directors in cases of prejudicial related-party transactions and by allowing the rescission of related-party transactions that are shown to harm the company.

Korea, Rep

DB 2015: The Republic of Korea strengthened minority investor protections by increasing the level of transparency expected from companies on managerial compensation.

DB 2013: Korea strengthened investor protections by making it easier to sue directors in cases of prejudicial related-party transactions.

Kosovo

DB 2013: Kosovo strengthened investor protections by introducing a requirement for shareholder approval of related-party transactions, requiring greater disclosure of such transactions in the annual report and making it easier to sue directors when such transactions are prejudicial.

Kuwait

DB 2014: Kuwait strengthened investor protections by making it possible for minority shareholders to request the appointment of an auditor to review the company’s activities.

Kyrgyz Republic

DB 2009: The Kyrgyz Republic strengthened investor protections by granting minority investors standing to undertake legal actions to protect their rights as shareholders, by requiring an independent assessment of related-party transactions before approval and by increasing remedies in cases of director negligence.

Lao PDR

DB 2015: The Lao People’s Democratic Republic strengthened minority investor protections by introducing requirements for directors to disclose in detail their conflicts of interest to the other board members and for companies to promptly disclose related-party transactions to the Securities Commission and to include the information in their annual reports.

Lesotho

DB 2013: Lesotho strengthened investor protections by increasing the disclosure requirements for related-party transactions and improving the liability regime for company directors in cases of abusive related-party transactions.

Lithuania

DB 2016: Lithuania strengthened minority investor protections by prohibiting subsidiaries from acquiring shares issued by their parent company.

DB 2012: Lithuania strengthened investor protections by introducing greater requirements for corporate disclosure to the public and in the annual report.

Macedonia, FYR

DB 2017: FYR Macedonia, strengthened minority investor protections by increasing shareholder rights and role in major corporate decisions, introducing greater requirements for immediate disclosure of related-party transactions to the public, allowing greater access to corporate information during trial and clarifying ownership and control structures.

DB 2016: FYR Macedonia strengthened minority investor protections by providing for both fines and imprisonment of interested directors in prejudicial related-party transactions.

DB 2015: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia strengthened minority investor protections by requiring prior review of related-party transactions by an external auditor.

DB 2014: FYR Macedonia strengthened investor protections by allowing shareholders to request the rescission of unfair related-party transactions and the appointment of an auditor to investigate alleged irregularities in the company’s activities.

DB 2010: FYR Macedonia strengthened investor protections by introducing regulations on the approval of related-party transactions, increasing disclosure requirements in the annual report and making it easier to sue directors in cases where related-party transactions harm the company.

Madagascar

DB 2016: Madagascar strengthened minority investor protections by requiring that directors with a conflict of interest fully disclose the nature of their interest to the board of directors.

Mali

DB 2015: Mali strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

DB 2010: Mali strengthened investor protections through an amendment to its civil procedure code increasing shareholders’ access to corporate information during trial.

Mauritania

DB 2017: Mauritania strengthened minority investor protections by requiring prior external review of related-party transactions, by increasing director liability and by expanding shareholders' role in major transactions.

Moldova

DB 2013: Moldova strengthened investor protections by allowing the rescission of prejudicial related-party transactions.

Mongolia

DB 2015: Mongolia strengthened minority investor protections by introducing a requirement for public joint stock companies to publicly disclose related-party transactions within 2 business days.

DB 2013: Mongolia strengthened investor protections by increasing the disclosure requirements for related-party transactions.

Morocco

DB 2017: Morocco strengthened minority investor protections by clarifying ownership and control structures and by requiring greater corporate transparency.

DB 2012: Morocco strengthened investor protections by allowing minority shareholders to obtain any nonconfidential corporate document during trial.

DB 2011: Morocco strengthened investor protections by requiring greater disclosure in companies’ annual reports.

Mozambique

DB 2008: Mozambique strengthened investor protections by enacting a new commercial code that allows shareholders to bring derivative suits against company directors, introduces detailed duties and liability for directors and major shareholders, expands the range of company information accessible to shareholders and permits shareholders to request the appointment of an expert to investigate the activities of the company.

Netherlands

DB 2013: The Netherlands strengthened investor protections through a new law regulating the approval of related-party transactions.

Niger

DB 2017: Niger strengthened minority investor protections by introducing a provision whereby requires the winning party’s legal expenses are reimbursed by the losing party.

DB 2015: Niger strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

Nigeria

DB 2016: Nigeria strengthened minority investor protections by requiring that related-party transactions be subject to external review and to approval by disinterested shareholders. This reform applies to both Kano and Lagos.

Norway

DB 2008: Norway strengthened investor protections through amendments to rules on related-party transactions in the Public Limited Companies Act.

Panama

DB 2014: Panama strengthened investor protections by increasing the disclosure requirements for publicly held companies.

Peru

DB 2013: Peru strengthened investor protections through a new law regulating the approval of related-party transactions and making it easier to sue directors when such transactions are prejudicial.

DB 2012: Peru strengthened investor protections through a new law allowing minority shareholders to request access to nonconfidential corporate documents.

Portugal

DB 2008: Portugal strengthened investor protections by clarifying directors’ duties, introducing a statutory provision on the business judgment rule and lowering the minimum shareholding threshold relating to the right of action against directors on behalf of listed companies.

Qatar

DB 2017: Qatar weakened minority investor protections by decreasing the rights of shareholders in major decisions, by diminishing ownership and control structures, by reducing requirements for approval of related-party transactions and their disclosure to the board of directors, and by limiting the liability of interested directors and board of directors in the event of prejudicial related-party transactions.

Rwanda

DB 2016: Rwanda strengthened minority investor protections by introducing provisions allowing holders of 10% of a company’s shares to call for an extraordinary meeting of shareholders, requiring holders of special classes of shares to vote on decisions affecting their shares, requiring board members to disclose information about their directorships and primary employment and requiring that audit reports for listed companies be published in a newspaper.

DB 2014: Rwanda strengthened investor protections through a new law allowing plaintiffs to cross-examine defendants and witnesses with prior approval of the questions by the court.

DB 2010: Rwanda strengthened investor protections through a new company law requiring greater corporate disclosure, increasing director liability and improving shareholders’ access to information.

Saudi Arabia

DB 2017: Saudi Arabia strengthened minority investor protections by strengthening ownership and control structures of companies and by increasing corporate transparency requirements.

DB 2009: Saudi Arabia strengthened investor protections by prohibiting interested parties from voting on the approval of related-party transactions and by increasing sanctions against directors found liable for harm to a company resulting from a transaction in which they had a personal interest.

Senegal

DB 2015: Senegal strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors; by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions; and by making it possible for shareholder plaintiffs to request from the other party, and from witnesses, documents relevant to the subject matter of the claim during the trial.

Sierra Leone

DB 2010: Sierra Leone strengthened investor protections through a new company act enhancing director liability and improving disclosure requirements.

Slovenia

DB 2013: Slovenia strengthened investor protections through a new law regulating the approval of related-party transactions.

DB 2009: Slovenia strengthened investor protections by allowing minority investors to initiate suits against directors on behalf of the company in order to defend their rights as shareholders.

DB 2008: Slovenia strengthened investor protections through a new provision requiring that a company’s board of directors obtain prior shareholder approval for transactions representing 25% or more of the company’s assets.

Solomon Islands

DB 2012: The Solomon Islands strengthened investor protections by increasing shareholder access to corporate information.

Spain

DB 2016: Spain strengthened minority investor protections by requiring that major sales of company assets be subject to shareholder approval.

Sri Lanka

DB 2017: Sri Lanka strengthened minority investor protections by requiring board and in some cases shareholder approval of related-party transactions and by requiring that such transactions undergo external review.

DB 2012: Sri Lanka strengthened investor protections by requiring greater corporate disclosure in case of transactions between interested parties.

Sudan

DB 2017: Sudan strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors, and granting shareholders preemption rights in limited liability companies. However, Sudan weakened minority investor protections by making it more difficult to sue directors in case of prejudicial related-party transactions, decreasing shareholder rights and role in major corporate decisions, and undermining ownership and control structures.

Swaziland

DB 2011: Swaziland strengthened investor protections by requiring greater corporate disclosure, higher standards of accountability for company directors and greater access to corporate information for minority investors. Swaziland reduced the time to import by implementing an electronic data interchange system for customs at its border posts.

Sweden

DB 2011: Sweden strengthened investor protections by requiring greater corporate disclosure and regulating the approval of transactions between interested parties.

Switzerland

DB 2015: Switzerland strengthened minority investor protections by increasing the level of transparency required from publicly traded companies.

Taiwan, China

DB 2013: Taiwan, China, strengthened investor protections by increasing disclosure requirements for related-party transactions and improving the liability regime for company directors in cases where such transactions are abusive.

Tajikistan

DB 2013: Tajikistan strengthened investor protections by making it easier to sue directors in cases of prejudicial related-party transactions.

DB 2011: Tajikistan strengthened investor protections by requiring greater corporate disclosure in the annual report and greater access to corporate information for minority investors.

DB 2010: Tajikistan strengthened investor protections through amendments to the joint stock companies law enhancing disclosure requirements for related-party transactions, increasing director liability in cases where related-party transactions harm the company and allowing shareholders to request the rescission of such transactions.

DB 2009: Tajikistan strengthened investor protections by introducing rules on the approval of related-party transactions, increasing disclosure requirements for such transactions and allowing minority investors to initiate suits against directors on behalf of the company in order to defend their rights as shareholders.

Thailand

DB 2009: Thailand strengthened investor protections by enhancing directors’ duties and increasing remedies in cases where related-party transactions harm the company.

Togo

DB 2015: Togo strengthened minority investor protections by introducing greater requirements for disclosure of related-party transactions to the board of directors and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to related-party transactions and to appoint auditors to conduct an inspection of such transactions.

Tunisia

DB 2010: Tunisia strengthened investor protections by enhancing approval and disclosure requirements for related-party transactions.

DB 2009: Tunisia strengthened investor protections by allowing minority investors to request in court the rescission of related-party transactions that harm the company.

Turkey

DB 2014: Turkey strengthened investor protections through a new commercial code that requires directors found liable in abusive related-party transactions to disgorge their profits and that allows shareholders to request the appointment of an auditor to investigate alleged prejudicial conflicts of interest.

DB 2009: Turkey strengthened investor protections by requiring that an independent auditor assess related-party transactions before approval.

Ukraine

DB 2017: Ukraine strengthened minority investor protections by requiring interested director or shareholder to be excluded from the vote, by requiring that proposed related-party transactions undergo external review, by introducing remedies in cases where related-party transactions are harmful to the company and also clarifying ownership and control structures.

DB 2010: Ukraine strengthened investor protections through a new joint stock companies law enhancing approval requirements for related-party transactions, increasing disclosure requirements in the annual report and making it easier to sue directors in cases where related-party transactions harm the company.

United Arab Emirates

DB 2017: The United Arab Emirates strengthened minority investor protections by increasing shareholder rights and role in major corporate decisions, clarifying ownership and control structures, and requiring greater corporate transparency.

DB 2016: The United Arab Emirates strengthened minority investor protections by barring a subsidiary from acquiring shares in its parent company and by requiring that a potential acquirer, upon reaching 50% or more of the capital of a company, make a purchase offer to all shareholders.

DB 2015: The United Arab Emirates strengthened minority investor protections by introducing additional approval requirements for related-party transactions and greater requirements for disclosure of such transactions to the stock exchange; by introducing a requirement that interested directors be held liable in a related-party transaction that is unfair or constitutes a conflict of interest; and by making it possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to a related-party transaction, appoint auditors to inspect the transaction and request a rescission of the transaction if it should prove to be unfair.

DB 2014: The United Arab Emirates strengthened investor protections by introducing greater disclosure requirements for related-party transactions in the annual report and to the stock exchange and by making it possible to sue directors when such transactions harm the company.

Uzbekistan

DB 2017: Uzbekistan strengthened minority investor protections by clarifying ownership and control structures.

DB 2015: Uzbekistan strengthened minority investor protections by introducing a requirement for public joint stock companies to disclose information about related-party transactions in their annual report; setting higher standards for disclosure of such transactions to the board of directors; and establishing the right of shareholders to receive all documents related to such transactions.

Vanuatu

DB 2017: Vanuatu strengthened minority investor protections by increasing shareholder rights and role in major corporate decisions and clarifying ownership and control structures.

Vietnam

DB 2017: Vietnam strengthened minority investor protections by making it easier to sue directors in cases of prejudicial transactions between interested parties, by increasing shareholder rights and role in major corporate decisions, by strengthening the ownership and control structures of companies and by increasing corporate transparency requirements.

DB 2014: Vietnam strengthened investor protections by introducing greater disclosure requirements for publicly held companies in cases of related-party transactions.

DB 2012: Vietnam strengthened investor protections by requiring higher standards of accountability for company directors.

DB 2008: Vietnam strengthened investor protections by increasing disclosure requirements for both regular and related-party transactions.

Zimbabwe

DB 2016: Zimbabwe strengthened minority investor protections by introducing provisions allowing legal practitioners to enter into contingency fee agreements with clients.