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Serbia: Faster, more orderly exit
Serbia was plagued by a bankruptcy process that was susceptible to corruption—including an infamous group known as the “bankruptcy mafia.” Something had to change, especially when winding up a failed Serbian enterprise could take 10 years or more.
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Italy: Repaying creditors without imprisoning debtors
In 2003 Italy’s bankruptcy law was over 60 years old—not ideal to keep up with economic transformation. Judges, lawyers, businesses, and creditors all knew that the law needed to change, but the process was slow. Then, in 2003, the wake of the crisis caused by Parmalat’s demise, the Italian government finally shifted focus to implementing structural reforms to enhance Italy’s competitiveness.
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Chile: Increasing transparency in insolvency proceedings
Before 2005, the receiver profession in Chile was poorly regulated and vulnerable to corruption. Scandals challenged the public’s faith in the system. To root out corruption, Chile worked to ensure that private receivers were specially trained, licensed, appointed, and paid through a transparent system.
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Tunisia: Transition to open markets and an improved insolvency process
As the first country in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to sign a European Union Association Agreement (EUAA) in 1995, Tunisia saw the need to strength its business environment in the face of increased competition from the European Union. Furthermore, Tunisia’s insolvency system needed to be improved as banks and other enterprises were privatized in the opening economy.
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Italy: Modernizing Italy’s bankruptcy law
Reforming bankruptcy laws can be difficult for many reasons. In Italy, first of all, attitudes toward bankruptcy made it a difficult subject to generate support for. Secondly, bankruptcy reforms are often complex and lengthy: They require changes not only to the bankruptcy law, but also to other important parts of the legal framework—such as the codes of civil procedures and, in the case of Italy, the penal code. Finally, they require support from those that must implement them. This paper outlines Michele Vietti's experience in leading Italy's Commission for the Reform of the Bankruptcy Law and the lessons he learned from it.
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